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A Review of Internal and External Influences on Corporate Governance 
and Financial Accountability in Nigeria 
Abstract 
No country exists in isolation, and as developing countries like Nigeria aspire to 
‘international’ standards of accountability and governance suited to the developed economies, 
they are confronted with the reality that it is difficult to separate the sociocultural context in 
which they operate from the external pressures to conform. This literature review provides 
deep insights into the developments in corporate governance and accountability in Nigeria, 
and in particular the influence of internal and external factors. While the extant literature 
suggests that the lack of corporate governance structures limits improvements in developing 
economies, we argue that the appropriateness, and the effectiveness of regulatory compliance 
systems explains corporate governance infractions in the country. We contribute to 
comparative corporate governance discourse, presenting important implications for key 
players in corporate governance development and monitoring, across global polity and 
practice.  
 
1.0 Introduction 
 Observing patterns of change is particularly relevant within the context of a developing 
economy like Nigeria, where it would appear that international pressures for change have 
over time influenced developments in corporate governance and financial accountability 
(Akinlo, 2004; Akinola, 2012). Like most developing countries, changes are constantly being 
made in Nigeria to aspire to standards of best practices developed in the more advanced 
economies. Change can be considered from two perspectives – ‘positive patterns of change’, 
which signal progress, or ‘negative patterns of change’, which would suggest retrogression. 
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There are important peculiarities in the socio-cultural, political and the economic 
environment in Nigeria, which presents a useful case study to examine these patterns of 
change in corporate governance development. These are some of the issues addressed in this 
paper. In particular, we present evidence of how a developing economy, Nigeria, has 
attempted to respond to the international pressures for change in corporate governance and 
accountability, whilst at the same time addressing its peculiar socio-economic challenges. In 
doing this, we focus on the question ‘how have the developments in the internal and the 
external environment influenced corporate governance and accountability in Nigeria?’  
According to Adegbite (2012, p. 258), “in formulating corporate governance regulatory 
strategies, countries must account for their specific circumstances. These include relevant 
historical perspectives; corporate ownership structures and characteristics; cultural norms and 
values; socio-political and economic climates; and the ethical environment of business 
conduct”. Thus, countries are anticipated to position their regulatory systems such that it is 
able to address the particular challenges faced. Corporate governance regulation in 
developing countries will possibly differ in terms of ideology, necessity, concerns, 
complexity and robustness in specific areas (Adegbite, 2012).  
However, corporate governance regulatory provisions in developing economies, such as 
Nigeria, continue to be under pressure to align with external standards frequently promoted 
by notable international organisations, such as the World Bank, among others. As a result, we 
consider the internal and external influences on the general development of corporate 
governance and accountability regulation and practice in Nigeria. In particular, this paper 
examines the role and the importance of disclosure and transparency in corporate governance, 
as well as the role of the auditing profession and the importance of education and training of 
key players. This study is important given that the limited literature regarding corporate 
governance in developing economies tends to suggest that the absence of an efficient 
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corporate governance system represents the basis of governance challenges in developing 
countries (Adegbite, 2012; Okike, 2007). This paper challenges this view, by suggesting that 
the lack of corporate governance regulatory structures is not the problem, but their 
appropriateness, and the effectiveness of monitoring the system for compliance. The rest of 
this paper proceeds with a review of relevant literature, followed by an examination of 
corporate governance in Nigeria. The influence of the internal (sociocultural and political) 
and external environments is thereafter considered. Next we discuss the implications for 
transparency and disclosure requirements, the role of the auditing profession and the 
education/training requirements of key players. Lastly, we summarise our contributions. 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
Attempts to ensure the efficient management of corporations have compelled shareholders 
(principals) to institute various mechanisms to facilitate effective engagement with 
management (agent) to minimise potential agency conflicts. The efforts to minimise agency 
conflicts have stimulated the development of the agency theory which seeks to address 
concerns that could undermine the shareholder wealth maximisation objective of corporations 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The theory, exposited by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) has 
attracted considerable awareness in recognition of its impact on shareholder-manager issues 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and its effect on firm performance (Bhagat & Black, 1999; Fama, 
1980). Eisenhardt (1989) provided an insight into the extensive application of the agency 
theory
1
. Based on Eisenhardt (1989)’s account, it could be reasoned that the agency theory 
has indeed provided a supra-national lens for assessing all corporate governance concerns 
                                                          
1
 Accounting (Demski & Feltham, 1978); Economics (Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971); Finance (Fama, 1980); 
Marketing (Basu, Lal, Srinivasan, & Staelin, 1985); Political science (Mitnick, 1992); Organisational Behaviour 
(Eisenhardt, 1985) and sociology (Eccles, 1983).  
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(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). But despite its extensive application, the theory assumes that the 
ability of a firm to achieve its wealth maximisation objective is enhanced by minimising 
potential conflicts between its main actors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Consequently, techniques, 
particularly the use of incentive and compensation strategies (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 
1999) have been advocated to address agent’s potential selfishness. However, Raelin and 
Bondy (2013) contend that despite these efforts, cases of agency challenges still abound. 
While agency issues have remained a global phenomenon, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) noted that the degree of corporate governance (and agency) 
problems is influenced by the level of economic sophistication of individual countries. In 
contrast with developed economies, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) assert that developing 
countries tend to lack some elements of a good governance system. These challenges have 
contrived to ensure that the effects of poor corporate governance are worse in developing 
economies compared to their developed counterparts. This assumption should be critiqued.  
For example, Roberts, McNulty, and Stiles (2005) challenged the dominant influence of 
agency theory on governance research arguing for theoretical pluralism with a view to 
promoting better understanding of board processes.  
Gailmard (2012) extend the preceding position by arguing that rather than seeking for 
theoretical pluralism as recommended in Roberts et al. (2005), agency theory offers a highly 
flexible family of models, which provides opportunities for principals to hold their agents 
accountable. The variations in positions of scholars regarding the significance of agency 
theory have nonetheless ensured the emergence of a body of literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Letza, Kirkbride, Sun, & Smallman, 2008) critiquing the application of agency theory. 
Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, and Very (2007) noted that this development has contributed to the 
growth of other theoretical perspectives such as institutional theory.  
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According to Scott (1987), institutional theory examines the institutional environment, its 
influence on societal beliefs and practices which influence societal “actors”. The theory seeks 
to promote an understanding regarding why and how organisations attend to their institutional 
environments (Suddaby, 2010). Scott (1987) indicates that the institutional environment 
provides the basis for institutional theorising, promoting an awareness of the influence of 
non-economic elements on corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Judge, 
Douglas, and Kutan (2008) argue that variations in the institutional environments across 
countries accounts for the differences in global corporate governance practice. Judge et al. 
(2008)’s position is, however inconsistent with the commonly-adopted practice of replicating 
the Anglo-Saxon (or US) model often engaged as ‘best practice’ model (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2010). Indeed, the majority of the studies applying agency theory to corporate governance 
and accountability research has consistently relied on data explaining practices in the 
developed world (Enriques & Volpin, 2007). This has contributed to a limited understanding 
of the governance problems in some parts of the world (Rwegasira, 2000) owing mainly to 
institutional differences (Adegbite, 2015). This paper examines the foregoing concerns, 
focusing on Nigeria. 
 
3.0 Corporate Governance in Nigeria: Regulatory Framework and Key Issues 
Against the backdrop of studies (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003) 
which suggest that good governance enhances economic development, the Nigerian 
government, via various regulatory agencies, has consequently sought to provide a 
framework for good governance within the country. Other factors such as the need to 
promote foreign investment inflow (Okike, 2007) and the increasing incidences of corporate 
failures (Inyang, 2009) have also heightened calls for improved corporate governance.  These 
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developments have resulted in increased academic, practice and policy interests in corporate 
governance matters in the country. However, considering that the business ownership model 
dominant in a system has implications for corporate governance, (Ahunwan, 2002), it is 
necessary to examine the prevailing ownership structure in Nigeria. 
A crucial feature of a country’s corporate system is the form of ownership dominant among 
firms in that country (Ahunwan, 2002). Jensen and Meckling (1976) attempted to define 
ownership structure along two fundamental views, indicating that ownership structure does 
not only describes the distribution of equity with regard to votes and capital but also by the 
identity of the equity owners. Zeitun and Tian (2007) demonstrate that ownership structure 
represents an important factor which affects the health of an organisation. Therefore, it can be 
reasoned that if the ownership structure affects an organisation’s performance, then it is 
possible that ownership structure could predict organisational profitability.  
In Africa, Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003) studied the effects of ownership structure on 
businesses, positing that ownership structure is affected by the internal arrangements put in 
place by an organisation. Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003) also observed that for publicly-
owned organisations where ownership is largely dispersed, the procedure for selecting board 
members is very important. But in a closely-held company with a controlling shareholder, the 
challenge is to prevent the controlling shareholder from extracting excessive benefits from 
the company at the expense of minority equity holders. In essence, it is necessary to identify 
what form of ownership structure is dominant in a corporate environment to scrutinise the 
prevailing view in the extant literature. In Nigeria, Yakasai (2001) notes that firm ownership 
represents a strategic basis for exercising power, especially during annual general meetings 
(AGMs) of public companies. Ahunwan (2002) informed that the ownership structure of 
Nigerian corporations was significantly influenced by the enactments of the Foreign 
Exchange Act (FEA) and Nigerian Export Promotion Decree (NEPD) which abolished 100% 
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foreign ownership in various sectors; these led to four categories of ownership systems 
among Nigerian businesses. According to Ahunwan (2002), these categories are: 
Category A - organisations that are wholly owned by government; 
Category B - joint ventures (JVs) involving government and major oil-producers. 
Category C - public companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE)  
Category D - consists of privately-owned organisations not listed on the NSE.  
 
Concentrated ownership (categories A, B and D) dominates the Nigerian corporate 
environment. Considering that there has been growing calls to change the paradigm of stock 
ownership from concentrated to dispersed ownership (Coffee, 2001; Gorga, 2009), it could be 
contended that concentrated form of ownership is potentially undermining the maximisation 
of wealth in Nigerian businesses. This is because the concentrated ownership structure, as 
Morck (2007) suggested, is capable of weakening financial accountability and transparency 
in an organisation, initiating agency problems. Considering the possible impact of this 
problem, it is important to develop a mechanism for mitigating the effects of this challenge. 
The codification of regulations, notwithstanding obvious challenges, has offered a viable 
strategy for addressing these types of issues. 
As in many parts of the world, the practice of corporate governance has been pursued by the 
establishment of a regulatory framework and the creation of an enforcement agency, backed 
with commensurate powers (Larcker, Ormazabal, & Taylor, 2011). This also explains the 
strategy which has been adopted in Nigeria to make boards and their organisations 
accountable to stakeholders. Inyang (2009) noted that the need to check the growing 
unwholesome practices among corporations was crucial to the enactment of the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990. While this Act was not specifically devoted to 
corporate governance issues, it however represented a pioneer attempt at addressing the 
mounting governance-related challenges among Nigerian firms. But despite the introduction 
of this regulation, the fundamental corporate governance problem has remained a recurring 
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problem (Yakasai, 2001). It was therefore necessary to launch a regulatory machinery solely 
dedicated to managing corporate governance complications. This formed the basis for the 
introduction of the SEC Code (2003) followed by other industry-specific codes such as the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Code (2006); the Code for licensed pension operators (2008) 
and the National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) Code (2010). In 2011, the SEC Code 
(2003) was revised and updated. This, according to Ofo (2011), was to reflect latest 
developments in the global business world and to tackle governance issues still prevailing in 
the business environment. In addition to the identified policy interventions, there is an 
attempt to harmonise the existing codes of corporate governance in Nigeria. Osemeke and 
Adegbite (2014) report that the Nigerian government signed into law the Financial Reporting 
Council of Nigeria (FRCN) Act in order to put together a framework unifying existing codes 
into a single applicable code for the corporate sector. 
However, despite the variety of policy and regulatory interventions, the practice of corporate 
governance in Nigeria is weak. Several challenges have been identified as the bane of 
corporate governance in the country. These include corruption (Akinlabi, Hamed, & Awoniyi, 
2011; Lawal, 2007); weak regulatory and enforcement mechanism (Inyang, 2009); 
multiplicity of codes (Wilson, 2006; Osemeke and Adegbite, 2014); disclosure and 
transparency issues (Oyejide & Soyibo, 2001); weak shareholder activism (Amao & Amaeshi, 
2008; Adegbite, Amaeshi & Amao, 2011); weak institutional arrangement (Adegbite & 
Nakajima, 2011); passive attitude of government (Ogbeidi, 2012); amongst many others. As a 
consequence, the impact of these challenges has been severe in the business environment. For 
instance, foreign investors are not encouraged to invest in the country, thereby hampering 
economic growth potentials (Akinlabi et al., 2011; Akinlo, 2004).  
Poor corporate governance practices have also promoted a culture of corruption in all areas of 
its economy. Indeed, the corruption challenge has ensured poor financial accountability in the 
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system (Akinlabi et al., 2011). For example, Idoko and Jimoh (2013) noted that the most 
controversial problem confronting many developing countries like Nigeria revolves around 
financial accountability. This corroborates an earlier study by Okpala (2012) where 
accountability was deemed weak in the Nigerian polity owing to factors such as weak 
accounting infrastructure, poor regulatory framework and nonchalant attitudes of government 
officials. Consequently, good corporate governance has been hampered by poor financial 
accountability, which managers display with regard to the discharge of their fiduciary 
responsibilities to their shareholders. It is therefore appropriate to examine and explore the 
internal and external factors that have created the corporate governance and financial 
accountability challenges in the system.  
 
 
4.0 The Influence of the Internal Environment 
We suggest that the system of corporate governance and financial accountability challenges 
existing in any country is shaped by a wide array of internal as well as external factors
2
  (see 
Figure 1). Internal factors include the state of the economy and the capital market, corporate 
and business culture, the legal system, government policies, professional/regulatory bodies, 
amongst others. The impact of these factors and the differences in the system operating 
within each country are well documented in the accounting and corporate governance 
literature (Adegbite, Amaeshi, & Nakajima, 2013; Rose & Mejer, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). This position has also impacted the scholarship of institutional theorists (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; North, 1990; Zucker, 1987). Though the Nigerian legal framework has been 
                                                          
2
 For a more in-depth analysis of the effect of these factors on corporate audit reporting, see Okike (1998) 
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greatly influenced by its colonial past, its attempt to acquire a more distinct identity led to 
interference with the auditing profession (Okike, 1994). 
 
FIGURE 1: Influences on Corporate Governance and Accountability 
================================================================== 
Similarly, MacLullich and Sucher (2004) report that economic, cultural and societal pressures 
may be a threat to auditor independence in transition economies. In their study of auditor 
independence in Poland and the Czech Republic, the authors found that the threat of societal, 
cultural and economic pressures to auditor independence far outweighed any formal 
safeguards designed to maintain professional competence. MacLullich and Sucher (2004) 
found that local culture had an impact on auditor independence since there was more 
emphasis on comradeship, loyalty to friends and family, and an adaptive approach to 
regulations. The dominant sociocultural practices, as argued by Wilson (2006), tend to 
influence economic agents negatively, which enhances sub-optimal behaviour on their part. 
This reinforces the views regarding the impact of socio-cultural elements on managerial 
activities, especially in developing countries where institutions are deemed to be weak 
(Akinlabi et al., 2011). Besides, Kajola (2008) not only presents some aspects of the socio-
cultural context of corporate governance and financial accountability in Nigeria, but also 
provides some insight into how developing countries are attempting to make themselves 
globally relevant, in spite of the weaknesses in their socio-cultural and economic 
environments.  
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Consistent with the foregoing, Herbert (2006) affirms that the crisis of morality in Nigeria is 
largely due to growing poverty, inept and corrupt leadership and lack of respect for human 
rights and the rule of law (see alsoAdegbite, Amaeshi, & Amao, 2011). This crisis in 
governance have been provoked by past military governments (Omotoso, 2013); inept public 
service (Beetseh, 2014); and weak political process (Ogbeidi, 2012). Corporate corruption, 
although not unique to Nigeria, is frequently highlighted in the literature as the principal 
corporate governance challenge. A study by Fisman and Gatti (2002) reported incidences of 
corruption in 55 countries. This has led to many high profile corporate scandals across the 
globe (Knights & O'Leary, 2005). It has consequently remained a major concern within the 
international business community (see Sandholtz & Gray, 2003). Its implication on the 
Nigerian business environment is more pronounced as Akinlabi et al. (2011) and Ogbeidi 
(2012) indicated that the majority of the problems in the country can be traced to pervasive 
corruption in the system.  
However, following recent anti-corruption initiatives, Nigeria is making progress at 
addressing corruption. At number 136 on the Transparency International (TI) 2014 corruption 
index survey conducted in 176 countries, Nigeria could be said to have made some progress, 
as it strives to move away from the notoriety of being one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world (Adegbite, 2015). Part of governmental efforts to address corruption includes the 
‘National Think Tank Project’ (NTTP) which will provide the basis for assessing and 
promoting the highest standards of effective governance in the public and private sector.  
Thus, it can be argued that on the one end of the accountability spectrum in Nigeria is the 
peculiarity of the socio-cultural environment, which is reflected in the country’s corporate 
governance and financial accountability framework, whilst at the other end is the need and/or 
the desire to be seen to be globally relevant. This is why the issue of global convergence of 
corporate governance and the harmonisation of accounting and auditing practices across the 
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globe is highly debated amongst accounting scholars (see Goergen, Martynova, & 
Renneboog, 2005). Developing countries find themselves sometimes being stretched beyond 
their levels of competence as they lack the necessary resources to effectively integrate 
external policies in their internal activities (Faye, McArthur, Sachs, & Snow, 2004). As a 
consequence, policies and regulations replicated from external jurisdictions that are adopted 
in some developing countries are ineffective due to the lack of a robust mechanism for 
adequate enforcement (Adegbite, 2012). This represents a major concern for institutional 
theorists, examining the effect of variations in an institutional environment on variables such 
as enforcement and compliance levels (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007; Judge et al., 2008).    
 
5.0 The Influence of the External Environment 
As interdependent economic activity transpires between nations, occasioned by international 
trade and the effect of globalisation, the need to harmonise business practices continues to be 
pertinent (Okike & Adegbite, 2012).  Figure 1 also shows some of the external influences on 
corporate governance and financial accountability in any country. Consequently, business 
enterprises in countries, especially in developing economies, where there are limited 
established standards of accounting, auditing and best practices in corporate governance, tend 
to adopt standards, principles and codes of best practices that are established in advanced 
economies, without due regard to their socioeconomic and political environment (Rwegasira, 
2000). In most cases, the mechanisms for the enforcement of such standards are either non-
existent or inappropriate (Amao & Amaeshi, 2008). This is because the level of effectiveness 
of institutions which drive the enforcement mechanism differ amongst countries (Doidge et 
al., 2007), hence in some countries, institutions lack the capacity to control the behaviour of 
economic actors (North, 1990).   
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Whilst there is a considerable volume of literature on corporate governance developments 
around the world, an understanding of the extent to which these developments are impacting 
other countries is minimal (Adegbite et al., 2013; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Agency 
implications of this development have been noted. For instance, differences in regulatory 
compliance levels have been identified as contributory to governance infractions in Nigeria 
(Inyang, 2009). Okpara (2010) also suggested that the low level of economic sophistication in 
developing economies tends to obscure the importance of good governance particularly 
among managers. However, the impact of the recent global economic recession has been 
considerable and led to the revision of corporate governance regulatory provisions in many 
countries. Also, the influence of organisations such as the OECD and the World Bank is 
helping to shape corporate governance around the globe (Adegbite et al., 2013).  The first set 
of internationally acceptable standards of corporate governance was produced by the OECD, 
which has led to the development of codes of best practices in many countries.  
A review of the accounting and auditing literature provides an overview of those factors that 
have influenced accounting and auditing practices in developing countries (see Wallace, 
1990). These include the colonial history, multinational affiliation and the fact that many 
developing countries lacked the capacity to develop their own standards. Figure 1 highlights 
other external factors, which influence accounting, auditing and corporate governance 
practices. Okike (1989) reveals how accounting standards in Nigeria, and consequently 
annual report disclosures, were influenced by the Nigerian accounting profession’s 
membership of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) (now reconstituted 
as the International Accounting Standards Board, IASB).  
Along similar lines, Okike (1998) examined auditors' reports on the accounts of listed 
companies in Nigeria over a 12-year period and noted that audit reporting in Nigeria has been 
greatly influenced by external factors. These factors include (i) the standards issued by 
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organisations such as the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and the IASC; (ii) 
the affiliation of auditors in Nigeria with one of the then ‘Big 6’ international accounting 
firms; and iii) the multi-nationality of the reporting entities (Okike, 1998). In relation to the 
foregoing, Okike (1999) noted that external influences in the financial reporting environment 
in Nigeria have led to increased corporate disclosures. However, the question remains as to 
whether or not additional information in corporate reports means more transparency and 
better financial accountability. Insights can be provided into these, if specific corporate 
governance drivers are examined in the light of internal and external influences. This is the 
subject of subsequent sections. 
 
6.0 Transparency and Disclosure  
The role and importance of disclosure and transparency in corporate accountability and 
governance cannot be overemphasised. While it has been the subject of much academic 
discourse, it has been considered as a key driver of agency complications in firms (Eisenhardt, 
1989). For example, Solomon (2013) explains that disclosure is critical to the functioning of 
an efficient capital market, which is fundamental to corporate governance. But what does the 
term ‘disclosure’ mean? Solomon (2013) describes disclosure as a whole array of different 
forms of information produced by companies such as the annual report and all forms of 
voluntary corporate communications. For example, the annual report and accounts of a 
company act as the channel of communication from the directors to shareholders and are 
important for corporate governance because these reports provide the means by which the 
directors are made accountable to the shareholders. Shareholders and other stakeholders use 
the information in the report to assess the stewardship of the directors and the financial health 
of the company (Coyle, 2006).  Therefore, the nature, quality and the timeliness of the 
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information disclosed in the annual report and the accompanying auditors’ reports are crucial, 
especially if agency issues are to be minimised. 
In its ‘final report’ in January 1998, the Hampel Committee on the UK Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance noted that the objective of the code is not to propose corporate 
behaviour in detail, but to secure sufficient disclosure so that investors and others can assess 
the performance of companies and governance practice in an informed manner.   Corporate 
disclosure to stakeholders is the means by which companies can become transparent and 
transparency is important because of information asymmetry (Solomon, 2013). Without 
adequate disclosure, the position could be unfairly weighted towards the managers since 
these agents have more knowledge of the company’s activities and financial situation than 
owner/investors (principals). Avoidance of information asymmetry requires not only 
adequate, but also reliable disclosure. In its ‘Principles for Corporate Governance’, the 
OECD also requires that information disclosed by companies be ‘accurate and timely’ 
indicating that strong disclosure is a fundamental characteristic of market-based monitoring 
of companies and critical to shareholders’ ability to exercise their voting rights (see Coyle, 
2006).  
Wallace (1987) examined the factors which are likely to determine the levels of disclosure of 
accounting information in a developing country. His study revealed that external factors 
(such as old colonial ties, membership of the International Accounting Standards Committee, 
direct foreign investment activities of multinationals) contribute considerably, if not totally, 
to the complex reality of financial reporting in Nigeria. According to Wallace (1987, p. 8), 
‘this influence seems to portray a picture of an external dependence, the consequence of 
which is the irrelevance of many of the financial reporting regulations and practices to the 
needs of the country”. Similarly, Okike (1989) examined attempts made by listed companies 
in Nigeria to disclose more information in their annual reports in line with international 
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standards of best practices. The study revealed a progressive increase in financial information 
disclosure over time, as a result of developments within the internal and the external 
environment (see Figure 1).  
 
7.0 Role of the Auditing Profession  
In Nigeria, independent auditors are required to audit the accounts prepared by management 
and to report to the shareholders. The Cadbury Committee noted in its Report that “the annual 
audit is one of the cornerstones of corporate governance… The audit provides an external and 
objective check on the way in which the financial statements have been prepared and 
presented” (Cadbury, 1992 36, para. 5.1).   Solomon (2013) notes that within a company’s 
internal control structure, the external audit embodies one of the most essential corporate 
governance checks and balances that help to monitor company management activities, 
thereby increasing transparency. This further highlights the important role of auditors in 
corporate governance. Given the need for utmost transparency in corporate disclosure, some 
companies ‘go the extra mile’ in their disclosures by providing relevant information above 
what is prescribed by legislation.  
According to Solomon (2013), improvements in disclosure stimulates better transparency. 
However, a review of the literature on voluntary disclosures revealed that most authors 
(Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Fishman & Hagerty, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watson, 
Shrives, & Marston, 2002) have concentrated on voluntary disclosures in annual reports
3
, as 
opposed to auditors’ reports. Furthermore, Okike (1994) revealed a lack of uniformity in 
reporting patterns in Nigeria, and suggested that audit firm characteristics (especially 
                                                          
3
 The reasons provided for the disclosures in annual reports include (i) the reduction in the cost of capital; (ii) 
the lowering of agency costs; (iii) improvement in the market price of the securities; iv) the effect of 
globalization; v) firm size effect, and so on 
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international affiliation of audit firms) appeared to be the most significant factor which 
influenced not only reporting patterns, but also, the disclosure quality indexes of the auditors’ 
reports.  
In Nigeria, auditors must be independent
4
, and must belong to one of the recognised 
professional accountancy bodies
5
. As a result, the audit function is a legal requirement. Prior 
to the enactment of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990, the Companies 
Act 1968 governed the operation of business activities in Nigeria
6
 . Both Acts require 
auditors to lend credibility to management prepared financial statements, through an 
independent examination of the books and records of the company (CA 1968, section 155; 
CAMA 1990, section 359). But the 2001 collapse of Enron and revelations of unethical 
behaviour by members of the boards of large corporations in the US has stimulated the debate 
about the credibility of the auditing profession and their usefulness in establishing confidence 
in the capital markets. Similarly, in the discharge of their professional duties, the auditing 
profession in Nigeria faced challenges, which questioned the legitimacy of their existence as 
a profession. For example, Okike (1994) presents the potential implications, when members 
of a profession allow conflict of interests to interfere with the discharge of their professional 
responsibilities, drawing attention to the tension/rivalry between the two professions of law 
and accountancy (see also Dezalay, 1991; Marcos, 2000). 
Accounting, auditing and corporate governance practices in Nigeria are subject to external 
influences, which are not surprising, given Nigeria’s colonial history and her membership of 
                                                          
4
 Independence is considered an important attribute of external auditors (Antle, 1984). Given the importance of 
auditors’ independence to the audit function, stipulating that auditors must be independent both in fact and in 
appearance may seem to be an obvious requirement. However, in practice, such independence may be difficult 
to achieve and easy to compromise (Porter, Simon, & Hatherly, 1996). This controversial subject has attracted 
the attention of accounting scholars (Craswell, Stokes, & Laughton, 2002; Sweeney & Roberts, 1997). 
5
Prior to the promulgation of the CAMA 1990, there was only one professional body of accountants recognized 
in Nigeria, for the purposes of undertaking the audit of listed companies. However, the enactment of the CAMA 
1990 paved the way for the recognition of other professional accountancy bodies in Nigeria (see Okike, 2007).  
6
 This Act was a replica of the UK’s Companies Act 1948, and as would be expected, the operation of business 
activities in Nigeria was identical to that of the UK 
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international organisations, such as the IFAC.  Such external influences often make demands 
which require the auditing profession to respond positively, by being proactive. Okike (1998) 
examined how these influences impacted on the reporting obligation of auditors in Nigeria, 
through the inclusion of non-mandatory disclosures in their report. She (Okike, 1998) further 
provided evidence that some auditors in Nigeria understand the need to respond to the 
demands of the external environment and respond appropriately. Hence, these auditors go 
beyond the requirements of the law in their reporting obligation, by disclosing more than the 
bear minimum required by law as part of their effort to be more transparent.  
Moreover, the quality of audit reporting relies on the quality of communication (i.e. good 
language, punctuation, and brevity enhance the delivery of the intended message) (see 
Adelberg, 1979). As a result, communicability, compliance and conformance, all contribute 
to the quality of audit reporting. In Okike (1999), it was shown that audit firms affiliated with 
the then ‘Big 6’, now ‘Big 4’ audit firms scored higher on the disclosure quality index than 
those not affiliated. The results also revealed that the variability in reporting patterns over 
time was dissimilar amongst the audit firms. Whilst members of the auditing profession in 
Nigeria may be proactive in their response to the demands of the external environment 
(Okike, 1998), it would appear that the challenges encountered in the profession had more to 
do with factors within the internal environment. The response of the profession is crucial, as 
this could determine the degree of success achieved in restoring public confidence in their 
members and the extent to which the legitimacy of their continued existence have been re-
established. 
According to ROSC (2004), the process of adjudicating on cases in Nigerian courts and law 
is so slow that regulators are discouraged from seeking support from courts and law 
enforcement agencies in enforcing sanctions. Besides, the penalties for infractions specified 
in CAMA 1990 that can be administratively applied to various non-compliance issues are too 
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weak compared to the gravity of the offences. This might explain why existing independence 
rules are breached. Although there would appear to be competition in the audit market, there 
is a shortage of qualified accountants in the private sector. Of the 18,000 members of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN), less than 5,000 are registered as 
auditors (Okike, 2007). ROSC (2004) reveals that competition in the audit market is causing 
many to leave public practice. The consequence is that some companies are not obtaining 
statutory audits or adhering to legal requirements to file annual audited accounts. In addition 
to the shortage of qualified accountants, there is also the problem of inadequate professional 
education and training for those that qualify. ROSC (2004) suggests that professional 
education has weakened over the last two decades.  
The importance of adequate education and training to achieve effective corporate governance 
and financial accountability cannot be undermined. If developing countries like Nigeria are to 
achieve better standards of corporate governance and financial accountability that will attract 
foreign investment into their economy, more needs to be done to ensure adequate education 
and training of key players in the corporate governance system. This issue is considered in 
the section that follows. 
 
8.0 The Importance of Education and Training 
The 2008/2009 global economic recession has highlighted the criticality of identifying 
strategies that would enhance how companies do business, including the need for education 
and training of those charged with the responsibility of ensuring the stability of investments 
in the capital markets. As the globalisation of investment flow continues, the availability of 
capital from international markets will increasingly flow to those economies and companies, 
which have sound corporate governance standards (see Khanna & Zyla, 2012).  
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The importance of education and training for all who engage in the corporate governance 
system cannot be overemphasised, whether these stakeholders are the directors who are 
charged with the management and control of large listed enterprises, the shareholders, 
auditors or members of the audit committees of these enterprises. For example, training 
should introduce directors to best practices in corporate governance, whilst providing new 
skills and knowledge to manage their companies better, especially in less-developed 
economies. In Malaysia, for instance, it is mandatory that directors in all publicly listed 
companies attend special training courses conducted under the auspices of the Stock 
Exchange and the Registrar of Companies. The emphasis is on the duties and legal 
responsibilities of directors (Aziz, 2002). Also, in Nigeria, the Committee on Corporate 
Governance of Public Companies in Nigeria (2001) recommended that “directors should all 
undertake some form of internal or external training, at the time of appointment to the board 
and later on a periodic basis” (page 6). Interestingly, however, this recommendation was not 
accorded significant recognition in the SEC Code (2003 and 2011), even as the issues faced 
by directors are increasing in complexity (see Macey & O'Hara, 2003).  
In the UK, the Higgs Report (2003) found that two-thirds of UK non-executive directors had 
not received any training or development and recommended that professional development be 
offered to all directors. This recommendation was reflected in the UK Combined Code (2003). 
The UK Combined Code (2003) recommends that “all directors should receive induction on 
joining the board and should regularly update and refresh their skills and knowledge” (para. 
A5). This relates both to their role on the board and also to any board committees on which 
directors might sit, such as the audit committee, or the remuneration committee. The 
Chairman must ensure that the facility is in place, and it is the responsibility of the company 
to fund the training and development (Mallin, 2005). Non-executive directors are required by 
 22 
 
the Code to “undertake appropriate induction and regularly update and refresh their skills, 
knowledge and familiarity with the company” (Code Principle A.5 and Provision A.5.1).  
In order to enhance the capacity of auditors to act effectively, audit committee members must 
have the skills, knowledge and expertise, supported by access to independent advisors, and 
must be up to date with new developments given increasing knowledge demand. Hence, in 
Canada, KPMG (2004) informs that audit committee members must be financially literate. 
Corporate governance rules require Canadian companies to disclose in their annual returns 
the relevant education or experience of each audit committee member to allow shareholders 
and others to understand each member’s qualifications. Furthermore, the disclosures must 
outline any experience that the member has participated in, contributing to or actively 
supervising on, especially where the experiences relate to preparing, auditing, analysing or 
evaluating financial statements.  
In Nigeria, ROSC (2004) reports that the audit committees of several companies in Nigeria 
are not effective because many committee members are not fully equipped to perform their 
function. This is not surprising given the socio-cultural and political issues behind such 
appointments
7
. Given the present drive to encourage foreign investments in the Nigerian 
corporate sector, there is the need to effectively manage the tripartite relationship between the 
shareholders, company management and auditors. Equally, it is crucial that necessary 
education and training of the trio in the corporate governance process in Nigeria be pursued 
in order to attract foreign investor confidence. In addition, one of the objectives of the newly 
created National Think Tank Project is “to provide high-quality research and education in 
order to promote a prosperous, fair and sustainable economy”.  
                                                          
7
 It is difficult to dissociate the ‘Nigerian factor’ from the way business are run in Nigeria, including 
appointments to Boards of listed companies, which are often politically based, than on the suitability of the 
appointment. 
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Furthermore, ROSC (2004) notes that educational institutions in Nigeria do not teach 
professional values and ethics as separate subjects in pre-qualification academic educational 
programs (para. C22). The report states that “although the practical experience requirement is 
adequate, the mechanism for assessing the experience gained by prospective professional 
accountants is inadequate” (para. C23). Also, given that there are now two recognised 
professional accountancy bodies in Nigeria, (see Akhidime & Eriabie, 2013; Uche, 2002), 
ROSC (2004) observes that their qualifying examination processes differ (para. C24). And 
whilst continuing professional education is compulsory, it is not effectively monitored and 
enforced for members not in public audit practice (para. C25).  
Moreover, “the best students are not retained in the accountancy profession” because of “low 
financial reward” (para. C26). ROSC (2004, para. C57) made a number of policy 
recommendations to strengthen professional education and training in Nigeria, including 1) 
the need to align the Continuing Professional Education (CPE) requirements with IFAC 
guidelines and review the arrangements for enforcing compliance with CPE requirements; 
2)Business ethics should be taught as a separate subject in undergraduate accounting and 
business programs, and professional qualifying examinations should include a paper on 
business ethics, and 3) university accounting curricula should be revised to enable students 
gain exposure to practical application of International Accounting Standards (IAS), 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Standards of Auditing 
(ISA).  
In addition, training programs should be arranged to help corporate accountants and 
practicing auditors gain exposure to accounting and financial reporting practices that are in 
accordance with IAS/IFRS. The training programs for practicing auditors should focus on the 
practical aspects of ISA and IFAC-issued Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants. In a 
similar vein, Iyoha and Oyerinde (2010) suggests that there is still much for the accounting 
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profession in Nigeria to do to continue to improve its reputation and integrity. The Nigerian 
accounting professional bodies must be ready to discipline members who fail to abide by its 
Code of Ethics and continue to demonstrate that it is capable of effectively regulating its 
members and providing them with the necessary guidance on current developments within 
the profession. Furthermore, given the practical nature of auditing and the dynamism of the 
environment in which auditors are exposed, there is the need for practitioners and the 
academia to collaborate in providing robust and effective auditing education to ensure that 
the auditors of the 21st century are equipped with the requisite knowledge and skills to cope 
with the demands and challenges of their roles in corporate governance
8
.  
 
9.0 Summary and Conclusion  
This paper has examined the developments in corporate governance and financial 
accountability in Nigeria and the various factors in the internal and the external environment, 
which have influenced these developments. Specifically, it presented an analysis of how 
Nigeria is responding to the international pressures for change in corporate governance and 
accountability within the private sector, whilst at the same time addressing local demands. 
This paper contends that it is not the lack of corporate governance structures in Nigeria that 
accounts for weak practices, but their appropriateness, taking into cognisance the country’s 
institutional environment, as well as the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms. 
Consistent with institutional theory, variations in the institutional environment imply that 
                                                          
8
 The use of the programme has particularly been beneficial to accounting and business students at the 
University of Sunderland. Since using it as part of the auditing curriculum, a number of the students who 
otherwise would never have had secured professional training contracts with the ‘Big 4’ accounting firms now 
have the opportunity. Having been exposed to the programme, many of the students have some understanding of 
the professional demands of the job and attend interviews with a certain degree of confidence, and are 
successful 
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attempts to respond to international pressures for good governance and accountability must 
take into account peculiarities in the Nigerian institutional environment.  
In relation, the ineffectiveness of members of audit committees is cited as one of the factors 
responsible for poor quality financial reporting and corporate governance in Nigeria (see 
ROSC, 2004). This represents a key agency concern as efforts to address this problem might 
mean increased agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) with implications for shareholder 
wealth maximisation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). We also highlighted, in this paper, that many 
members of the audit committees are ill-equipped to discharge their functions. The 
consequence is that corporate governance structures are not as effective as intended. Whilst 
there is a case for international corporate governance standards owing to the pressure of 
globalisation and the need to attract foreign investments into the country, Nigeria must 
constantly review its Codes of Best Practices to ensure that it addresses its peculiar socio-
cultural environment, especially the issue of corruption, auditor independence and education 
of stakeholders. These are the important areas covered in this paper. 
Theoretically, corporate governance determinants, discussed in this paper, have implications 
for our understanding of financial accountability in different institutional contexts. For 
instance, the effect (whether positive or negative) of the local environment on the behaviour 
of management cannot be discounted. In many developing countries like Nigeria, where 
individuals display a strong affinity towards their environment and culture, there is a 
likelihood that their actions might be tailored to conform to societal expectations. 
Considering the many problems regarding Nigeria, particularly the high level of corruption, 
the Nigerian society, more often than not, tends to have a negative consequence on the 
decisions of managers. This act, while restricting the expected contribution of management, 
could eventually create conflict between management and shareholders. This is a variant of 
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the agency problem, highlighting both the usefulness and limitations of the traditional agency 
theory in capturing the dynamics of corporate governance in weak market institutions.   
While this paper shows how the Nigerian corporate scene is responding to the international 
pressures for change in corporate governance and accountability, there is the need for further 
research into what steps are being taken to ensure and enforce compliance with corporate 
governance, auditing and financial reporting requirements. In the near future, this can be the 
subject of an empirical study focusing on the impact of the new Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) Code on corporate governance improvements and its associated implications on 
investor confidence in financial reporting in Nigeria. Also, given the importance and the need 
for adequate education and training of all the key players in the corporate governance 
structure (particularly auditors, directors, shareholders and audit committee members), further 
research is required to ascertain the effectiveness of existing education and training 
provisions.  
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Figure 1: Factors that could Influence Corporate Governance and Accountability 
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